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Local tax incentives and behavior of foreign enterprises: evidence from a large 
developing country 
Jing Xing1, Wei Cui2, and Xi Qu3 
Abstract 
We analyze how profit reporting and investment behavior of foreign enterprises 
respond to local tax incentives in China, a large developing country. Using firm-level 
data between 2000 and 2013 from China’s industrial enterprise survey, we first 
provide strong evidence for tax competition among Chinese cities (especially cities 
within the same province) over the average effective income tax rate. We then find 
that, despite stringent capital controls, both reported pre-tax profits and investment of 
foreign firms respond strongly to local tax incentives, suggesting that subnational tax 
competition in China is oriented towards both mobile profits and real resources. 
Key words: tax competition, FDI, investment, profit shifting 
1. Introduction
One distinctive aspect of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development’s (OECD) Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project, especially 
compared to the OECD’s previous initiatives in international taxation, is its attempt to 
build an “inclusive framework” that addresses the needs and concerns of developing 
countries.4 It is claimed that developing countries are particularly vulnerable to profit 
shifting of multinational enterprises (MNEs) because they rely to a greater extent on 
corporate income tax revenue than developed economies, and because they lack 
expertise in dealing with tax planning and tax avoidance (IMF 2014; Crivelli et al 
2016). The participation of developing countries thus has a potential both to shape and 
to legitimize the BEPS project. However, while existing studies find that profits 
allocation by MNEs can be highly sensitive to tax incentives in the host country, 
almost all studies focus on developed countries; much less is known about the extent 
of profit shifting in less developed countries.  
The need to empirically investigate the extent of BEPS phenomena in the 
developing world is urgent for at least two reasons. First, developing countries’ 
policies towards cross-border trade and investment often substantially deviate from 
those of developed countries. To implement industrial policy, to shield themselves 
1 Antai College of Economics and Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University. Email: 
jing.xing@sjtu.edu.cn. 
2 Peter A. Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia. Email: cui@allard.ubc.ca. 
3  Antai College of Economics and Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University. Email: 
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4 The political sponsorship of the BEPS project by the G20, which includes the BRICS countries as 
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from financial instability originating in global financial markets, and for other reasons, 
developing countries often retain capital control (IMF 2012; Ghosh and Qureshi 2016; 
Fernández et al 2015). At the same time, many developing countries also offer tax 
incentives to attract foreign investment (Klemm and van Parys 2012)—of the types 
that they deem desirable. This combination (noted in Desai et al 2006) of the use of 
tax measures to attract, but the use of capital control to select and monitor, foreign 
investment, is rarely observed in developed countries. And it has complex 
implications for MNE tax planning: prima facie, it simultaneously curtails the means 
of tax-motivated profit shifting and reduces the scope for such shifting. Second, the 
severity of BEPS phenomena even in developed countries has been challenged in 
recent empirical research: improved data and methodologies have tended to show that 
MNEs’ propensity for tax-motivated profit shifting may be much weaker than claimed 
by earlier studies and by popular and policy discourses. A recent survey of this debate 
(Dharmapala 2014) concludes that more research should be carried out to investigate 
the specific channels of MNE profit shifting, and to study legal and other frictions that 
may cause MNEs to “under-exploit” tax avoidance opportunities. Caution about the 
gap between the rhetoric and reality of BEPS seems even more relevant in developing 
countries, given the abundance of institutional obstacles to foreign investment in the 
latter.   
 
In this study, we investigate MNE profit reporting and investment behavior in 
response to tax incentives in China, a large developing country. China has been one of 
the largest recipient countries of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the world since the 
1980s. Until a decade ago, it offered very generous tax incentives to attract FDI, and 
even today, China’s corporate income tax (CIT) regime boasts of a relatively low 
statutory tax rate as well as competitive effective average and marginal tax rates, in 
addition to an especially attractive low rate for companies with intangibles (Devereux 
et al., 2016). Yet at the same time, despite decades of reform in many aspects of the 
economy, China had retained one of the strictest capital control regimes in the world. 
The country thus exemplifies the interventionist policies towards foreign investment 
that MNEs face in many other developing countries. Interestingly, as a G20 country, 
China has been one of the most active non-OECD participants in the BEPS project. 
This fascinating policy configuration raises questions about how to interpret China’s 
policy stance, and more importantly, what the reality of BEPS is for MNEs investing 
in China.  
 
Our study identifies MNE profit reporting and investment responses to tax 
incentives in China through variations in effective income tax rates at the prefectural 
city level.5 Using accounting information from a large Chinese enterprise survey 
dataset covering 2000-2013, we examine whether reported pre-tax profits are 
sensitive to city-level tax incentives. As a supplement, we collect a smaller sample of 
                                                                                                                                                                              
well as several other non-OECD countries, is partly responsible for this approach.    
5 Unless otherwise indicated, all references to Chinese cities below refer to prefectural cities—which 
are jurisdictions subordinate to provinces but superior to (and encompassing) counties. 
3 
 
foreign firms from the database Oriana, which provides information on the home 
countries of foreign firms operating in China. We find significant effects of city-level 
tax incentives on MNE reported profits and investments. Further, we find that despite 
strict capital controls, reported profits of the Chinese subsidiaries of these MNEs are 
highly sensitive to the tax rate difference between their host cities and the parent 
country.  
 
Studying MNE profit shifting and investment responses in China using city-level 
variations holds several attractions. First, under the assumption that capital control 
policies are implemented much more uniformly across Chinese cities than tax policies, 
we are able to separate MNE behavior motivated by the goal of circumventing capital 
controls from tax minimization behavior. Second, because of China’s capital control 
regime, any cross-border profit shifting that can be observed arguably are achieved 
only through a narrow range of techniques—mostly current account transactions 
involving transfer pricing and service payments. Therefore, to a greater extent than 
many previous studies, our research design allows profit shifting to be matched to 
specific mechanisms. And third, by comparing the magnitude of profit shifting to 
similar studies carried out in other countries without capital controls, one can obtain a 
quantitative indication of the significance of institutional frictions on tax planning. 
 
Just as importantly as these observations about the mechanisms of profit shifting 
and about the effectiveness of tax incentives under capital control, our study, by 
estimating spatial reaction functions, uncovers robust evidence for fierce tax 
competition over effective income tax rates among Chinese cities. This sheds 
important light on the politics of BEPS implementation: even if China’s national 
policymakers favor pursuing anti-tax-avoidance policies, support for such policies 
may be weak in other parts of the Chinese government, especially among subnational 
politicians competing for investment-driven growth.6 Moreover, we find evidence 
that MNEs do respond to Chinese cities’ tax incentives by investing more, which 
would be consistent with a conception of tax competition as being over real resources 
and not just mobile profits.  
 
In addition to the literature analyzing the extent of MNE profit shifting and the 
policy discourse surrounding BEPS,7 our study contributes to two other strands of 
research. The first is a literature using rigorous spatial-econometric techniques to 
identify patterns of sub-national tax competition in China. In contrast to a few recent 
studies, we argue that subnational tax competition in China is more plausibly 
analyzed at the city rather than at the provincial level: such an approach is more 
consistent with both rapidly developing political science research on subnational 
                                                             
6 It has been observed that the BEPS project may be in conflict with many OECD countries’ intent to 
engage in tax competition, and may merely narrow the forms of such competition (see, e.g. Collier and 
Maffini 2015 on the U.K.). Our study, by examining subnational income tax competition to attract 
foreign capital, empirically portrays an analogous reality in China. 
7 BEPS Action 11 specifically calls for empirical research “measuring and monitoring BEPS”, yet little 
such research has emerged in the last few years.  
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politics in China and with anecdotal and legal documentation of the locus of tax 
competition. Moreover, our use of firm-level data, our focus on effective income tax 
rates, and our estimation strategies are in greater conformity with trends in research 
on corporate tax competition (Devereux and Loretz, 2013).  
 
The second additional research strand to which our study contributes is the study 
of investment responses to tax incentives. Previous studies find that tax incentives are 
important for the location choice of FDI (Devereux and Griffth, 1998, 2003). Our 
study suggests that conditional on the location choice, the intensive margin of foreign 
investment is strongly affected by local tax incentives, which is consistent with 
evidences regarding domestic firms.  
 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we provide a brief review 
of China’s corporate tax system and recent policy changes, and lay out our views 
about the relationship between capital control and tax avoidance, the locus and 
mechanisms of subnational tax competition, and the extent of MNE profit shifting in 
China, all in relation to relevant recent scholarship. Section 3 describes the data and 
the sample. We provide evidence for interjurisdictional tax competition at the city 
level in Section 4. In Section 5, we present results regarding the sensitivity of reported 
profits and investment of foreign firms with respect to city-level tax incentives. 
Section 6 concludes. 
2. Capital control, subnational tax competition, and international profit shifting 
 
The current Chinese CIT system is the product of a major reform and statutory 
change in 2007. Before 2008, two separate regime of corporate income taxation 
applied to domestically-owned firms (DOEs) and foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs, 
which category includes both firms wholly-owned by foreign entities and joint 
ventures). The regime pertaining to FIEs offered extensive tax preference to foreign 
investors, including (i) lower statutory tax rates (15% or 24%, as compared to the 
general statutory rate of 33% applicable to DOEs) for FIEs set up in China’s many 
“special economic zones”, “economic development zones”, “open economic zones”, 
etc.; (ii) tax holidays with complete or partial tax exemptions; (iii) zero withholding 
tax on dividends and tax rebates for re-invested earnings, and (iv) narrower statutory 
tax bases as compared with the regime for DOEs (Li 2007). The dual regimes were 
replaced by a single CIT regime under the Enterprise Income Tax Law, effective in 
2008, which unified the taxation of DOEs and FIEs, eliminated all domestic tax 
preferences targeted at FIEs, and introduced a general statutory rate of 25%. DOEs 
thus enjoyed substantial reductions in both their tax rate and tax base after 2008, 
while FIEs experienced a substantial rate increase.8  
 
                                                             
8 China is thus among the few countries that raised the statutory tax rate on foreign investment in the 
last two decades.  
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Since around 2009, China’s tax authorities began to pursue several policy 
initiatives to combat tax avoidance by MNEs, such that China has come to be 
portrayed in recent years as an exemplary developing country that actively defends its 
tax base against profit shifting (Li 2015, 2016). However, the objective extent of 
MNE tax avoidance in China is still unknown. A close look at tax policy 
implementation and MNE behavior in China also reveals a complex reality. Two 
issues that deserve particular emphasis are the relationship between capital control 
and tax policy instruments in influencing the decisions of MNEs, and the effect of 
subnational tax competition on China’s national anti-avoidance initiatives.   
 
2.1 Capital control and tax planning 
 
China maintains a strict capital control regime (Fernández et al 2015; Bayoumi 
and Ohnsorge 2013). There are many ways in which a capital control system may 
limit tax planning opportunities and otherwise increase tax paid by MNEs.  
 
Most importantly, capital control can simply render many tax planning 
techniques irrelevant. For example, a general policy against cross-border debt 
flows—such that capital account transactions are largely limited to investments of 
equity capital—would seriously dampen earnings stripping through the payment of 
interest to shareholders, as well as disguised dividends that transfer funds to 
shareholders through outbound loans. China has maintained a strict debt-to-equity 
ratio for FIEs for capital control purposes ever since the 1980s, and its restrictions on 
outbound loans (especially for non-financial institutions) were near absolute until very 
recently. Cross-border loans all require government approval, and their terms 
(including the interest rates charged) are closely scrutinized during the approval 
process and must generally fall within the comfort zones of (non-tax) regulators. 
Similarly, the equity structures of any FIE and transactions among shareholders are 
also governed by a highly inflexible regulatory regime.9 The licensing of intellectual 
property must also be registered with bureaus of industry and commerce, and 
contracts for royalty payments—including royalty rates—must be reviewed by 
government agencies before they can take effect. The idea that multinationals can 
shift profits by contractually allocating risk through mere legal artifices—which 
animates much of the OECD’s BEPS project—is far from Chinese reality.   
 
 As a result of arcane and inflexible rules applicable to capital account 
transactions, techniques for tax avoidance—and for mitigating the effect of capital 
control—mainly involve current account transactions.10 In fact, manipulating transfer 
pricing and arranging service payments that lack economic reality are attractive ways 
                                                             
9 Derivative contracts are generally not available to non-financial institutions. No financial instruments 
permitted by the capital control system give rise to any ambiguity as to debt v. equity characterization.   
10 It is thus not accidental that China’s most active engagement with the BEPS project is in the area of 
transfer pricing—the pricing of intra-group sales of goods and services (Li 2016), which generally go 
through current accounts. 
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for FIEs to simultaneously circumvent Chinese taxation and capital control. 11 
However, the goals of circumventing capital control and lowering tax liability do not 
always align. If circumventing capital control is sufficiently important, for example, 
“intra-group trade deficits” might be observed even if China is the jurisdiction with 
the lower tax rate. As another example, the difficulty of bringing capital into China 
implies that keeping retained earnings within China may often be a good idea, even if 
there is a lower taxed jurisdiction to which the earnings can be repatriated.12  
 
 Overall, therefore, one should expect that MNEs engage in less tax-motivated 
profit shifting with respect to their investments in China than they would in countries 
with no or less stringent capital control. Moreover, where MNEs are in fact observed 
to engage in profit shifting (e.g. arranging inappropriate transfer pricing or service 
payments), the question can be raised as to whether they are motivated by tax as 
opposed to other reasons. For example, Chan and Chow (1997) report transfer pricing 
audits conducted in China in the early 1990s resulting in adjustments even for FIEs 
that face very low tax rates.13 A key challenge to studying tax-motivated profit 
shifting in China is thus separating the effects of capital control and tax policy. 
 
We approach this challenge on the basis of the following reflections. Several 
Chinese bureaucratic systems that play roles in approving and monitoring capital 
account transactions can be influenced by subnational governments by virtue of 
funding and appointment.14 At least in theory, they could adjust their efforts in the 
enforcement of capital control policies to aid local governments in the competition for 
foreign investment. Yet there have been few reports of “race to the bottom” in these 
regulatory areas. Why is this? We believe the answer lies in the fact that the routine 
monitoring of both capital and current account transactions is carried out by China’s 
national banks under the supervision of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange 
(SAFE). SAFE itself forms a part of the regulatory system of the People’s Bank of 
China and is considered among the most centralized of all of China’s regulatory 
                                                             
11 Clausing 2001, 2004 show that multinationals’ subsidiaries in high tax countries are more likely to 
run “intra-group trade deficits”: the value of imports from related parties may be over-stated and the 
value of exports to related parties may be under-stated. In any country with capital control as well, 
intra-group trade deficits would also serve the purpose of circumventing capital control. 
12 It should also be recognized that tax administration in China with respect to foreign investors is 
aided tremendously by the capital control regime. Among the documents that need to be presented to 
banks and regulators for the approval of outbound payments are “tax completion certificates,” which 
certify not only that withholding tax has been properly deducted and paid to the tax bureaus but that the 
paying entities themselves have complied with their tax obligations. 
13 We are not aware of previous scholarship that considers the impact of capital control on MNE’s 
tax-motivated profit shifting. Desai et al 2006 show that capital control policies may have similar 
effects as source-country taxation in reducing investment, and the MNEs may adopt tactics to 
circumvent capital control that are similar to tax avoidance tactics.  Devereux et al 2008 argue that 
countries would engage in tax competition to attract mobile capital only after they lift capital control. 
Because the appropriate measurement of the extent of capital control is still debated (IMF 2016), 
studies on the effect of capital control on MNE behavior based on cross-country data arguably should 
be complemented by within-country studies that identify changes in capital control more precisely. 
14  These include, for example, subsidiary agencies of the National Development and Reform 




agencies. While both SAFE and the major banks have branches across China, their 
connections with subnational governments are weak, and are themselves unlikely to 
systematically implement city government policies for purposes of attracting capital.15 
Other agencies that do have incentives to aid local government would still have to 
gain the cooperation of SAFE and the banks to adjust capital control policy, which 
may be difficult.  
 
This suggests that city-level variations in firm profit shifting behavior should not 
reflect variations in capital control policy. In choosing to study profiting shifting at 
the city level, the goal of separating the effect of capital control and tax policy also 
dovetails with our conception of the locus and mechanism of subnational tax 
competition in China, as we discuss in the next section.  
 
2.2 Subnational tax competition 
 
Even in a country where the national sovereign has imposed capital control, 
subnational governments may engage in tax competition among themselves for 
foreign capital. Where the effect of tax policy ultimately depends on subnational 
enforcement, national policy may be eroded by sub-national competition (Cai and 
Treisman 2004). We present evidence suggesting that MNEs shift profit in response 
to city-level variances in tax rates, which implies that subnational policy 
implementation is an important aspect of Chinese international taxation.    
 
i. The locus of tax competition 
 
Analyzing Chinese domestic tax competition and its effect on foreign companies’ 
profit shifting behavior requires one to articulate assumptions about the locus and 
mechanisms of tax competition.  In terms of locus, we study inter-jurisdictional 
interactions at the city level, motivated by our view that the primary locus of tax 
competition in China is at the sub-provincial levels. Many considerations support this 
view. First, the now-large literature on political tournaments in China shows that 
political competition based on nurturing local GDP growth can be empirically 
observed at the county- and city-levels (Lü and Landry 2014; Yu et al 2016). In fact, 
performance-based political competition is more intense at these sub-national levels, 
where political turnover is faster and there is greater upward mobility, than at the 
provincial levels (Lü et al 2016). If one conceives of tax competition in China as 
resulting from GDP-focused political competition, then one would expect to observe 
the former at the sub-provincial levels, where jurisdictions compete with one another 
rather than being coordinated by a provincial principal.  
 
                                                             
15 This is not to claim that the SAFE and bank branches are very uniform in the implementation of 
SAFE policy; it is instead only to suggest that local variations are random rather than systematic. 
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Second, the structure of the Chinese state is such that most governance tasks are 
performed by country and city level governments. Provincial governments act as 
policy and fiscal intermediaries between the central and sub-provincial governments 
for the most part, but do very little directly to implement policy. Provincial tax 
bureaus, for example, are generally thinly staffed, while most tax collectors are 
employed at the county and lower levels (Cui 2015). Thus insofar as government 
actors affect firms’ effective tax rates through mechanisms such as altering the 
strictness of enforcement and providing rebates after taxes are collected, these actions 
would almost certainly take place at the sub-provincial rather than provincial levels.16   
 
It is worth noting that one recent study of subnational tax competition in China 
(Liu and Martinez-Vazquez 2014) which we later refer to is based on the assumption 
that provincial governments are the main agents in such competition.17 For the 
reasons given above, this is a questionable depiction of reality in China, and our 
empirical evidence of income tax competition at the city level is also inconsistent with 
it.18  
 
ii. The mechanisms of tax competition 
 
China’s public finance system has gone through substantial transformations over 
the past 35 years. Subnational tax competition assumed different forms and dynamics 
during different periods; empirical analyses using data drawn from different periods 
must accordingly be tailored to the relevant forms of tax competition.  
 
It has been widely observed that after the major tax reform of 1994, the power to 
set tax policy in China became highly centralized: nominally, roughly the same law 
applies across the country. Against this background, a first mechanism for 
sub-national governments to offer tax incentives—especially in the CIT sphere—is 
the creation of economic development zones (EDZs). By national statute, EDZs 
                                                             
16 Legal research on large bodies of policy documents issued since the 1980s relating to illicit 
subnational tax preferences also indicates that most of such preferences are issued by sub-national 
governments. The Chinese central government has been cracking down on what it perceives as 
impermissible tax policy discretion at sub-national levels ever since the early 1980s (Cui 2013). 
Provincial governments were often put in the role of agents of the central government in monitoring 
and cracking down on tax preferences that contravene national policy. They may play this role with 
greater or lesser zeal (i.e. doing more or less to hide impermissible sub-provincial tax preferences or to 
protect sub-provincial jurisdictions from the political consequences of illicit policies), but they 
themselves—who are most easily monitored by the central government—act as direct sponsors of 
preferential tax policies less frequently.  
17 They “refer to the provincial government as a single entity that represents and captures all the 
competing behaviors of subnational governments in that particular province,” arguing that “horizontal 
competition among sub-provincial governments should not be an issue, since they act as agents of 
provincial governments at the local level, and so their behaviors, at most, are only the reflections of 
provincial governments’ policies.” 
18 Note also Yang and Xu (2011), using provincial data of aggregate income tax paid and gross profit 
of foreign invested enterprises, finds no evidence of strategic interactions among provinces (and thus 
no direct evidence of tax competition).  杨晓丽、许垒（2011）,《中国式分权下地方政府 FDI 税收
竞争的策略性及其经济增长效应》，《经济评论》第 3 期. 
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provide preferential tax rates. However, the implementation of the Enterprise Income 
Tax Law beginning in 2008 reversed many of the income tax preferences tied to EDZ 
status. Moreover, we are not aware of any statutory (or other formal) tax preferences 
other than under the CIT that are tied to EDZ status. Therefore preferences under 
other taxes (e.g. VAT, the sales tax on services, personal income tax, property and 
other taxes) should be no more likely to be granted in EDZs than in other jurisdictions. 
Consequently, EDZ creation cannot be thought of as the primary mechanism for tax 
competition in recent years.  
 
A second, arguably more prevalent practice in domestic tax competition is 
refund-after-collection (RACs). An RAC policy involves a sub-national government 
at the city or county level refunding a portion of the taxes paid by a firm—typically 
capped by that government’s share in the revenue collected under China’s tax sharing 
system.19  While extremely prevalent (by anecdotal accounts), RACs are empirically 
challenging to study for several reasons. First, because of the conflicting views 
towards RACs taken by Chinese central and local governments, RACs tend to be 
individually negotiated and not published. Second, because a refund need not 
nominally reduce the tax paid by a firm to the official treasury, “well-designed” RACs 
(i.e. policies fashioned to be in accordance with the letters, if not the spirit, of the law) 
do not change accounting reports of income and other taxes paid, and would at best 
show up on financial statements as government subsidies. Therefore they would not 
affect accounting measures of ETR.20 Third, the economic impact of different forms 
of RACs on a firm’s profitability is complex. While a refund of income tax paid is 
similar to a tax rate reduction, a refund of VAT paid by the firm, for instance (which 
may simply reflect VAT collected from customers), would be equivalent to a cash 
subsidy, the quantity of which may depend on the type of input employed rather than 
profitability.21 The refund of other taxes (e.g. the personal income tax) other than the 
CIT could similarly have complex effects on investment and profit reporting 
decisions.  
 
Yet a third way for local (especially city- or lower-level) governments to engage 
in tax competition is to deviate from national law and control the level of enforcement 
                                                             
19 RACs were first adopted around the time of the 1994 tax reform, as sub-national governments 
sought, against the centralization of tax policy making power, to preserve very extensive tax 
preferences granted during the 1980s. The central government initially accepted RACs as transitional 
measures, but beginning in 1997 argued that they were illegal tax preferences in disguise. However, 
local governments can rely on the legal position that RAC refunds—which can be appropriated from 
the general budget and need not reduce the amounts of tax actually paid by any firm to the official 
treasury—represent spending decisions and therefore not constrained by the centralization of tax law 
and policy making. RAC policies thus persisted in the 21st century and are as relevant today as it had 
ever been. 
20  Wu and Li (2007) find  that local tax refund policies nominally prohibited by the central 
government reduced the effective tax rates of listed companies 吴联生、李辰：《“先征后返”、公司税
负与税收政策的有效性》，《中国社会科学》2007(4): 61-73.  However, their data relates to an earlier 
period when RAC policies are less well-disguised. 
21 The higher is the proportion of non-taxable inputs (including labor), the larger is the refund. 
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in tax collection. 22  Discretionary tax collection—or simply negotiated tax 
payments—could render a firm’s tax payment substantially different from what would 
be required under the law. This form of tax competition, unlike RAC subsidies, 
should be reflected in ETR measures.  
 
2.3 The extent of BEPS in China 
 
 Chinese subsidiaries of MNEs currently face a general income tax rate of 25%, 
while the withholding tax on passive income earned by foreign investors (e.g. 
dividends, interest, royalties, and capital gains) is capped under domestic law at 10% 
and may be further reduced under tax treaties. While these rates represent an increase 
from the tax regime for FDI that prevailed until 2007, they are not unattractive when 
compared internationally. How strong the tax reasons are to shift profits out of China 
is thus an open question. Further, if the government is able effectively to limit the 
means of international tax avoidance through capital control, the need to take strong 
tax policy stances on avoidance seems attenuated. 
 
Systematic evidence for MNE profit shifting out of China is scant. Several recent 
studies (An 2012a, b; An and Tan 2014), using the 2008 EIT reform as a policy 
experiment, purport to present evidence of tax avoidance behavior among FIEs in 
China. These studies argue that because the CIT rates on FIEs increased in 2008, 
evidence that FIEs are more likely to report lower profits, increase debt ratios, or 
decrease investments relative to domestically-owned enterprises captures their 
avoidance behavior. However, the design of these studies faces an important objection: 
they all rely on a difference-in-difference approach by treating domestically-owned 
firms as control groups in the 2008 policy experiment. However, domestically-owned 
firms cannot be appropriately regarded as control groups in the 2008 policy change, 
because the statutory rates they face were substantially lowered (from 33% to 25%) as 
a result of the same reform. Consequently, domestically-owned firms can be expected 
to increase investments and reported profits and/or decrease debt ratios.23 Even if 
FIEs did not respond to the policy treatment, different trends between domestic- and 
foreign-owned firms could emerge post-2008. 
 
3.  Data and sample constructions 
 
We use several data sources to construct our sample and variables. The main 
source is the Chinese enterprise survey data provided by the National Bureau of 
                                                             
22 Although offices in the Local Tax Bureau system are considered to be especially cooperative in this 
sphere of discretionary enforcement, we believe State Tax Bureau offices are also likely to coordinate 
with local governments. 
23 On the capital structure response of domestic firms to the decrease in tax rates in 2008, see 王跃堂、
王亮亮、彭洋，《产权性质、债务税盾与资本结构》，《经济研究》，2010 年第 9 期， pp 122-36. 
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Statistics (NBS). The NBS data is similar to the Longitudinal Research Database 
(LRD) maintained by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, and collects annual accounting 
and ownership information for “all state-owned and all above-scale non-state owned 
industrial enterprise”. The “above-scale” criterion excludes industrial enterprises with 
annual sales below 5 million RMB. To reflect firm growth over time, the inclusion 
threshold increased from 5 million to 20 million RMB in 2011. The NBS database has 
been widely used in academic research on China due to its comprehensive coverage 
(see Brandt et al. (2014) for detailed information). The NBS data we obtain starts 
from 1998 and the most recently available year is 2013. We focus on the period 
2000-2013, for which we have information for the essential control variables at the 
city level. We exclude 2010 from our sample since we do not have reliable NBS 
survey data for that year. 
 
We focus on tax competition at the city level for reasons discussed in Section 2. 
To measure local tax incentives resulting from both policies and enforcement, we use 
the average effective tax rate (AETR) as a proxy. More specifically, we first calculate 
firm-level average effective tax rate as CIT paid divided by pre-tax profits. We then 
calculate the average level of AETR across all firms located in the same city in a 
given year. As there is no meaningful measure for the AETR for loss-making or zero 
profit firms, we exclude these firms from our calculation. Our approach of measuring 
local tax incentives is similar to that used by Desai et al. (2006). 
 
As detailed in Section 4, we include a set of city-level characteristics as control 
variables in our analysis about tax competition across cities. To construct these 
control variables, we rely on official city level statistical yearbooks. Definitions of 
these variables are provided in Section 4 and Table 1. 
 
We focus on foreign firms located in 113 cities that belong to 8 Chinese 
provinces (Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Shandong, Liaoning, Hebei, and 
Henan), the majority of which are located in the coastal area. There are two reasons 
for focusing on this subset of provinces. Firstly, for consistent estimations of the 
extent of interjurisdictional tax competition, we require each city in each province to 
have non-missing AETR. Nevertheless, as FDI in China tends to be geographically 
concentrated, we do not have sufficient coverage of foreign firms (especially 
profitable ones) in many cities. Secondly, data on city-level characteristics is 
incomplete for many cities throughout our sample period 2000-2013. For the cities 
located in the 8 provinces we focus on, we have the full set of necessary information. 
It is worth noting that these 8 provinces attract a large fraction of the universe of 
foreign firms in the NBS data: the total number of foreign firms in our sample 
amounts to nearly 70% of the full database. Since FDI traditionally favors coastal 
areas than inland areas, our sample should also be representative.  
 
To investigate foreign firms’ profit shifting and investment behavior, we collect 
other essential firm-level information from the NBS data, including fixed assets, the 
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number of employees, annual sales, and reported pre-tax profits. We take the natural 
logarithm of all these variables to be consistent with existing empirical studies.24 For 
our regression analysis, we exclude observations with extreme values. (i.e. those in 
the top or bottom 1 percent of the distributions regarding the key variables for each 
analysis). We also require each firm in the sample to have at least 3 years’ 
observations.  
 
Table 2 provides summary statistics of both city-level and firm-level variables. 
The AETR for foreign firms in our sample has a mean of 0.12 during the period 
2000-2013. The effect of the 2007 Enterprise Income Tax (EIT) reform is reflected in 
the AETR, the mean of which is around 0.1 before 2008 but increases to around 0.15 
during the post-reform sample period. It is worth noting the AETR is, on average, 
substantially lower than the statutory CIT rate for foreign firms both before and after 
the EIT reform. Although the statutory income tax rate for foreign firms was raised to 
25% after 2007, there was a 5-year phasing-out period, which partly explains the 
lower AETR after 2008. But as discussed in Section 2, this deviation from the 
statutory rate should also reflect tax policies and approaches to enforcement adopted 
by city governments. 
 
4.  Interjurisdictional tax competition 
 
In this section, we document the existence and extent of tax competition at the 
city level. Exiting studies on cross-region fiscal interdependence in the Chinese 
context have focused on political tournaments analogous to the type of yardstick 
competition highlighted by Besley and Case (1995). For example, Caldeira (2012) 
and Yu et al. (2016) find evidence for yardstick competition regarding public spending 
policies. There are fewer studies specifically about tax competition in China, despite 
various anecdotes. One exception is Liu and Martinez-Vazquez (2014), who 
document significant tax competition for FDI across Chinese provinces during 
1993-2007, using the measure of all tax revenue (i.e. not just income tax) paid by 
FIEs to FDI capital stock. As discussed in Section 2, however, the tax competition 
phenomenon should be much stronger within provinces rather than across provinces.  
 
Empirically, we adopt the spatial panel data model to investigate strategic 
interactions in tax policy among cities in China. More specifically, we consider three 
model specifications:  
 
(1) The spatial panel data model with the spatial fixed effects: 
  
                                                             
24 We use reported pre-tax profits in logs as the dependent variable in our analysis about the profit 
shifting behavior of foreign firms. This excludes loss-making firm-year observations. We will discuss 
this issue in more details in Section 5.1. 
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with  and  representing the dependent variable (outcome) and independent 
variables (characteristics) of the spatial unit i at time t,  being the spatial fixed 
effect of unit i,  being the time fixed effect of t,  being an n-dimensional vector 
of ones, and   being the i.i.d. error term.  is an n-dimensional spatial weight 
matrix and its (i,j) th entry  measures the relationship between spatial unit i and j. 
For example, to investigate interdependence between geographically neighboring 
cities, we can set  if i and j are contiguous neighbors and 0 otherwise. To 
investigate within-province tax competition, we can instead set  for cities 
located within the same province, and 0 otherwise. Then 𝑊𝑛𝑌𝑛𝑡 is an n-dimensional 
vector representing the neighbor’s outcome at time t, 𝑊𝑛𝑌𝑛,𝑡−1 is the neighbor’s 
outcome from the previous period, t-1. We refer to  as the spatial lag term, 
 as the time lag, and   as the spatial-time lag. Hence, in the spatial 
dynamic panel data model, , the outcome of spatial unit i at time t is affected by its 
own characteristics , the time lag , and the neighbors’ outcomes at current 
and previous periods, namely, the spatial lag and the spatial-time lag. The spatial 
correlation is captured by the coefficients associated with the spatial and spatial-time 
lags. 
 
In our model, the dependent variable  is the average effective tax rate for 
profit-making firms located in city i in year t. The parameter of interest is λ, which 
captures the interdependence of the average effective tax rate across cities. 
 
𝑥𝑖𝑡  includes important city-level characteristics that might affect local tax 
incentive provisions. Our choice of the control variables is mainly based on factors 
that may affect FDI decisions and the fiscal conditions of the local government. The 
logic is that these factors in turn should be reflected by the local government’s choice 
of tax incentives. 
 
Industrial composition and the wealth of local population could influence the 
investment decision of foreign firms. For example, foreign firms may prefer to 
operate in more industrialized cities than in a more rural environment. To take into 
account the effect of the composition of the local economy, we control for the ratio of 
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the primary industry (agriculture, forestry, fishing and mining) to GDP and the ratio of 
the secondary industry (manufacturing) to GDP. The omitted group is mainly the 
service industry. Foreign firms may also prefer to carry out business in wealthier cities 
where the potential consumer market are likely to be larger. Thus, we include two 
variables to proxy for the wealth of the local population: the natural logarithm of real 
output per capita and the natural logarithm of average wage. 
 
Koh et al. (2013) find that economic agglomerations exert a positive impact on 
the jurisdictional tax rate choice. Agglomeration effect is likely to influence 
investment decision of foreign firms. Therefore, we follow the method used by Koh et 
al. (2013) to construct an urbanization measure 𝑈𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ (
𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑖.𝑡−𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑗.𝑡
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑗
)𝐽𝑗=1 , where 
𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑖.𝑡 is the number of employees in city i in year t and 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑗 is the geographic 
distance between the two cities i and j. In our empirical analysis, we construct several 
urbanization measures using employment, the industrial output, the share of industrial 
output, or the domestic industrial output. Regression results are very robust regarding 
to these different measures of urbanization, so we only report estimates using 
employment and the number of firms. 
 
Other factors that may affect FDI decisions include a city’s infrastructures and 
human capital. In the Chinese context, Head and Rice (1994) find that cities with 
good infrastructures and an established industrial base are more attractive to FDI. We 
thus include growth rate of road transportation, the number of hospitals (in logs), and 
the ratio of college students in total population. 
 
We use the total government expenditures as a ratio to total output to proxy for 
the local governments’ demand for tax revenue. To control for city-level business 
environment in general, we include output growth, total fixed asset investment as a 
ratio to total output and the percentage of loss-making firms in total number of foreign 
firms in each city. 
 
The three spatial panel data models are estimated using MLE (maximum 
likelihood estimation). For model (3), estimators from the direct MLE approach has 
the asymptotic bias. Thus, we use estimators after bias correction from Lee and Yu 
(2010). 
 
We report estimates from two specifications of the spatial weight matrices: the 
contiguity matrix where 𝑤𝑖𝑗 is 1 if the two cities are contiguous; and the province 
matrix where 𝑤𝑖𝑗 is 1 if the two cities belong to the same province. In both cases, we 
further row-normalize the weight matrix. Then 𝑊𝑛𝑌𝑛𝑡 is the weighted average of the 
neighboring cities. 
 
Table 3 reports our estimation results based on the full sample 2000-2013. In 
Columns 1-3, we estimate Models 1-3 by setting  if i and j are contiguous 
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and 0 otherwise. The estimated coefficient on the spatial lag is between 0.17 and 0.30 
in different columns, and it is significantly different from zero. These results indicate 
that city i’s AETR will increase 0.17-0.30 percentage point when the mean of the 
AETR of neighboring cities increases 1 percentage point, all else equal. The estimated 
coefficients on the time lag and the spatial-time lag are both positive and significant in 
Column 3, suggesting possible bias in the estimated coefficient on the spatial lag in 
Model 1 and Model 2. Column 3 also indicates that the tax incentive of city i is 
affected by not only the level of tax incentives of its neighboring cities in the same 
year, but also by tax incentives of its neighbors in the previous year.  
 
In Columns 4-6, we instead set  for cities located within the same 
province, and 0 otherwise. We observe much stronger interdependence between cities 
within the same province regarding their tax incentives offered to foreign firms—the 
estimated coefficient on the spatial lag is more than doubled in corresponding 
columns. This result is consistent with our discussion in Section 2 that tax competition 
for foreign firms should be fiercer within provinces. Again, we find in Column 6 that 
both the time lag and the spatial-time lag are significant, which suggests possible bias 
in Model 1 and Model 2. 
 
Next, we investigate whether there is any difference in the pattern of tax 
competition before and after 2008, for two reasons. First, if, prior to 2008, a main way 
to attract FDI is to create economic development zones (as Liu and Martinez-Vazquez 
2014 argue), income tax competition over AETR could be weaker. We can test this 
hypothesis by conducting sub-sample analysis. Second, existing studies on tax 
competition often focus on the period before 2008 due to lack of more recent data. By 
splitting the sample, we can more directly compare our estimates with those in 
previous studies.  
 
The sub-sample analysis results are reported in Table 4A and Table 4B. Results 
based on the two sub-samples are broadly similar to those in Table 3. While we find 
strong evidence of competition over AETR both before and after 2008, the 
competition appears to be more intense in the latter period. 
 
5.  Tax incentives and behavior of multinationals under capital controls 
 
In the previous section, we find strong evidence of tax competition at the city 
level in China. In this section, we use the variation in the tax incentives across cities 
to identify the extent of tax motivated profits shifting among foreign firms, and to 





5.1 Reported profits of foreign enterprises 
 
We first investigate whether reported pre-tax profits of foreign firms are sensitive 
to local tax incentives, by conducting the following two exercises. First, we estimate 
the responsiveness of the reported pre-tax profits of foreign firms with respect to the 
city-level AETR. We use both cross-sectional and time-series variation in the 
city-level AETR in different cities for identification. As discussed in Section 2, since 
there is little variation across cities regarding the strictness of capital controls, our 
approach can identify the extent of tax-motivated profit shifting.  
 
Second, as a more refined test of profit shifting, we collect a smaller sample of 
foreign firms for which we know the location of the parent company. The NBS 
database does not provide information on the location of the parent company. Thus, 
we match the database Oriana (provided by Bureau van Dijk) with the NBS database 
by a firm’s business identification number. Since the coverage of Oriana is less 
comprehensive than the NBS, we only manage to match 5 percent of the NBS sample 
with Oriana. Next, we match the corporate income tax rate data provided by the 
Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation with this smaller sample, based on 
the parent companies’ location. This gives us both cross-sectional and time-series 
variation in the CIT rate faced by the foreign firms’ parent companies. We then 
calculate the difference between the CIT rate in the parent country and the AETR in 
the host Chinese city, labeling this variable as DIFF_RATE𝑖,𝑡 for a foreign firm i in 
year t. As presented in Table 2, on average, foreign firms in our sample faced a much 
lower tax rate in China than in their home countries both before and after the EIT 
reform in 2008, although the reform substantially narrowed such gap. 
 
Empirically, we follow the approach by Hines and Rice (1994) and estimate 
Equation 4: 
 
(4) 𝑙𝑛𝜋𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝜏𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖,𝑡+𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
where 𝜏𝑖,𝑡  captures the tax incentives for reporting profits. We use either the 
city-level average AETR or DIFF_RATE𝑖,𝑡 in separate exercises. 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖,𝑡 is the natural 
logarithm of net fixed assets and 𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖,𝑡 is the natural logarithm of the number of total 
employees. In all estimations, we control for common and province-level business 
cycle effects by including year dummies and province-year dummies. By including 
year dummies, we also control for any variation in the strictness of capital controls 
over time.  
 
Table 5 reports our estimation results based on Equation 4 for the first exercise. 
Columns 1-3 report the OLS regression results. In the OLS regressions, we also 
control for province and industry fixed effects.25 In different specifications, we find 
                                                             
25 The industrial classification system changed in both 2003 and 2013 in the NBS database. We match 
the old and new industry codes and consequently, we have consistent industry classifications for our 
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that the city-level AETR is strongly and negatively correlated with the reported 
pre-tax profits of foreign firms. In Columns 4-6, we control for firm-level fixed 
effects. One caveat is that firm-level fixed effects are likely to absorb much of the 
cross-sectional tax rate variation. Nonetheless, we continue to find similar patterns in 
these columns. The results imply that all else equal, foreign firms not only tend to 
report higher pre-tax profits in cities with a lower AETR, they also tend to report 
higher pre-tax profits when a city lowers its AETR, and vice versa. The magnitude of 
this coefficient appears to be larger for the sample period 2008-2013. Regarding fixed 
assets and employee numbers, the estimated coefficients on these two variables are 
rather stable in different columns. 
 
We only consider cross-sectional and time-series variation in the city-level 
AETR in the first exercise. To directly test for the existence and extent of 
tax-motivated profit shifting, we then regress firms’ pre-tax profits on DIFF_RATE 
based on the matched NBS-Oriana sample as described above. The results are 
reported in Table 6. We find that DIFF_RATE is negatively associated with foreign 
firms’ reported pre-tax profits in all columns in Table 6, and the estimated coefficient 
on DIFF_RATE is significant in all columns except Column 5. It is worth noting that 
there is much less time-series variation in DIFF_RATE during 2000-2007. This might 
explain why the estimated semi-elasticity of pre-tax profits with respect to 
DIFF_RATE is insignificant in Column 5, when we control for firm-level fixed 
effects.  Nevertheless, the overall pattern in Table 6 is rather consistent with that in 
Table 5, which again suggests substantial sensitivity of the reported pre-tax profits to 
local tax incentives. 
 
Overall, we find that the reported pre-tax profits of foreign firms operating in 
China are rather sensitive to local tax incentives and to the differential tax rate 
between China and their parent countries, despite the country’s stringent capital 
controls. One implication of our analysis is that all else equal, foreign firms should 
have strong incentives to report smaller profits following the EIT reform in 2008, 
which substantially increased the statutory income tax rate and AETR they face.  
 
Our estimate of the semi-elasticity of pre-tax profits with respect to changes in 
the tax incentives for profit-shifting appears to be within the range of previous 
estimates. For example, Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013) conduct a meta-analysis on 
this issue. For the 22 studies they focus on, the mean of the estimated semi-elasticities 
is 1.78 and the median effect is 0.97. Accounting for all potential misspecification 
biases, Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013) predict that this semi-elasticity is around 
0.8. Admittedly, our analysis is different from existing studies in many dimensions 
(such as the measure for the tax incentives, and the fact we are analyzing a developing 
country). Nonetheless, the evidence suggests that the extent of tax-motivated 
profit-shifting in the Chinese context is not substantially different from that found in 
more developed countries.  





Some studies on tax-motivated profit shifting use earnings before interest and tax 
(EBIT) as the dependent variable instead of pre-tax profits, since the responsiveness 
of EBIT to tax incentives excludes profit shifting using financial instruments. We 
conduct a similar analysis and, in Table 7, compare the semi-elasticity of EBIT with 
respect to DIFF_RATE with the semi-elasticity of pre-tax profits, thus decomposing 
the semi-elasticity of pre-tax profits due to non-financial and financial shifting 
techniques. We define EBIT as pre-tax profits plus interest expenses. To make the 
comparison, we use a sample where both EBIT and pre-tax profits are observed. 
Missing observations regarding interest expenses render the sample used in Table 7 
slightly different from that used in Table 6. Following Heckemeyer and Overesch 
(2013), we first estimate the semi-elasticity of EBIT with respect to DIFF_RATE, and 
label this semi-elasticity as 𝛾𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇. Then, we calculate the semi-elasticity of pre-tax 
profits due to non-financial instruments as: 
 
𝛾𝑁𝐹 = 𝛾𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 ×
EBIT
Pre − tax  profits
 
  
One caveat is that the ratio of EBIT to total pre-tax profits has a rather skewed 
distribution. Thus, we exclude the top 2.5% observations regarding this ratio. After 
excluding the outliers, the sample mean of EBIT/Pre-tax profits is 1.230. We obtain a 
semi-elasticity around 0.284 for EBIT in the OLS regressions based on Equation 4, 
and a semi-elasticity around 0.444 for pre-tax profits using the same sample. Hence, 
the implied semi-elasticity of pre-tax profits due to non-financial shifting technique 
equals 0.284*1.230=0.349, and that due to financial shifting instruments equals the 
residual. In the last columns of Table 7, we calculate the percentage of shifting 
through non-financial and financial techniques based on the previous column. We find 
that non-financial shifting techniques explain around 79% of total profit-shifting.  
 
As a robustness check, in Panel B of Table 7 we exclude the top 5% observations 
in the distribution of EBIT/Pre-tax profits, and re-do the exercise as in Panel A. The 
results are similar, although the mean of EBIT/Pre-tax profits decreases to 1.165. In 
the last column, we find that non-financial shifting techniques explain around 82% of 
total profit shifting. 
 
Overall, results in Table 7 indicate that financial instruments (i.e., interest 
payment) are not the predominant methods for tax-motivated profit shifting for 
foreign firms operating in China. Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013), based on their 
meta-analysis of profit shifting in developed countries, find that non-financial 
techniques could explain around 72% of total tax-motivated profit shifting. Our 
estimate is higher, although not by a large degree. This result is consistent with our 
hypothesis that profit-shifting via current account is most relevant in the Chinese 




5.2  Investment behavior of foreign enterprises 
 
One remaining issue is that whether local governments compete just over more 
mobile profits or real investment. We analyze this issue in this section. Our empirical 
specification is based on the neoclassical investment theory (Jorgenson, 1963; Hall 
and Jorgenson, 1967). The theory suggests that in equilibrium, the optimal level of a 
firm’s capital stock should be positively associated with the level of its output, and 
inversely associated with the tax-adjusted user cost of capital.26 In the special case 
where a firm has the Cobb-Douglas production technology and constant returns to 
scale, the elasticity of capital stock with respect to changes in output should be 1 
while that with respect to changes in the user cost of capital should be -1. Bond and 
Xing (2015) find that such theoretical predictions are likely to hold for investment in 
equipment and machinery for manufacturing sectors from 14 OECD countries during 
1982-2007, although there remains much controversy about the magnitude of the user 
cost elasticity in this literature. 
 
It is not an easy task to calculate precisely the tax-adjusted user cost of capital 
𝑈𝐶  because one needs to know not only the marginal tax rate but also the 
(inflation-adjusted) tax base. To calculate tax base precisely, one needs to know the 
detailed depreciation scheme for different types of assets for tax, rather than 
accounting, purposes. In addition, one needs information such as the real interest rate 
and the physical depreciation rate of assets. In the absence of such information, we 
use two variables as proxies for the tax-adjusted user cost of capital: first, the city 
level average AETR; and second, the natural logarithm of 1/[1-AETR]. We use both 
proxies as we do not know which functional form is more suitable a priori. We expect 
the estimated coefficients on the two proxies to be negative and significant, as both 
should be highly correlated with the tax-adjusted user cost of capital. Moreover, we 
expect the estimated coefficients on the tax incentives to be similar to the estimated 
coefficient on output which is also predicted by the neoclassical investment theory. 
However, if capital controls seriously dampens the effectiveness of tax incentives, the 
estimated coefficients on the two proxies for tax-adjusted user cost of capital are 
likely to be small or even insignificant.  
 
Our empirical specification is as follows: 
 
(5) 𝑙𝑛𝐾 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖,𝑡+𝛽2𝜏𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
where 𝜏𝑖,𝑡 is the tax-adjusted user cost of capital in logs, as proxied by the two 
variables mentioned above (𝜏𝑖,𝑡, the city-level 𝐴𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑗,𝑡 and ln (1 − AETR𝑗,𝑡)
−1 if 
firm i located in city j.) We report OLS estimation results with province dummies, 
                                                             
26 Bond and Xing (2015) provide a detailed derivation of the first-order condition for a profit 
maximization firm, which implies a log-linear relationship between capital, output and the tax adjusted 
user cost of capital. 
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year dummies, and province-year dummies. We also report within-group estimation 
results when controlling for city level fixed effects.  
 
Table 8 reports the within-groups estimation results based on Equation 5. In 
Columns 1-3, we use the city-level AETR to capture the tax effects on capital 
accumulation. In Columns 4-6, we instead use ln (1 − AETR)−1 . The pattern, 
nonetheless, is similar regardless which variable we use. For the whole sample period 
2000-2013, we find that the level of fixed assets of foreign firms was strongly 
sensitive to the local tax incentives, and the negative sign of the estimated coefficients 
on tax incentives is consistent with the neoclassical investment model. Besides, the 
absolute value of the estimated 𝛽2 is close to that of the estimated 𝛽1. This pattern of 
our results is similar to that reported by Bond and Xing (2015) for OECD countries. 
Splitting the sample into the pre-2008 and post-2008 subsamples, we find that 
investment appears to respond to local tax incentives more strongly since 2008.  
Conclusions 
 
The preliminary results of our study offer two novel sets of findings. First, 
Chinese subsidiaries of foreign MNEs seem clearly to respond to city-level variations 
in average effective tax rates in their profit-reporting and investment behavior. 
Moreover, profit reporting behavior is also sensitive to changes in the differential 
between the AETR that a host Chinese city is able to offer and the statutory tax rate in 
the home country of the Chinese subsidiary’s parent company. Insofar as such 
sensitivity reflects cross-border profit shifting, it is plausible to view such shifting as 
motivated by tax and not the goals of circumventing capital control, since capital 
control regimes are uniform across cities. Moreover, MNE profit shifting seems to 
have intensified after 2008, as China’s reform of its corporate income tax increased 
the statutory and effective tax rates on foreign investments. The sensitivity of MNE 
investment decisions to varying AETR across regions also seems to have increased 
after 2008. 
 
 Second, we produce evidence for tax competition over AETR offered to foreign 
investment across the Chinese cities that host a predominant portion of the country’s 
FDI. The evidence is novel in our use of firm-level data and our direct estimation of 
spatial reaction functions. It appears that subnational tax competition is especially 
intense among cities within the same province, and is able to attract real investment. 
Given that such competition intensified after the tax rate for foreign investment was 
raised in 2008 and several years into the Chinese national tax administration’s 
anti-tax-avoidance campaigns, China’s international tax policy seems to be 
characterized by strong internal tensions.  
 
Further work remains to be done to refine and interpret these preliminary results. 
With respect to MNE profit shifting in China, for example, our estimated 
semi-elasticity of pre-tax profits to AETR is similar to such semi-elasticity with 
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respect to statutory tax rates found for developed countries. This is somewhat 
surprising, as one may have expected greater frictions for profit shifting in China. 
Perhaps relatedly, our analysis at the present does not completely preclude the 
possibility that the profit reporting sensitivity to AETR is the result of domestic 
instead of cross border profit shifting. Such possibility deserves further exploration.  
 
 With respect to our second set of findings on subnational tax competition, we 
believe that the significant spatial interactions over city-level AETR for FDI cannot 
be adequately explained by “spill-over” phenomena distinct from competition over 
real resources. For example, because tax revenue from FDI is not a substantial portion 
of city governments’ source of income, it is unlikely that the interactions we observe 
are the product of expenditure competitions. Nonetheless, more work may be required 
to rule out such alternative explanations. Moreover, there are reasons to believe that 
Chinese local governments’ tools for tax competition—especially through rebates, 
rewards, and subsidies tied to tax payments—are increasingly unlikely to be reflected 
in firms’ effective income tax rates. The evidence of growing competition over AETR 
thus also requires further examination.  
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Tables and Figures  
Table 1: Variable definitions and data sources 
AETR Average effective tax rate measured at the city level (NBS) 
LnK The natural logarithm of net fixed assets (NBS) 
LnQ The natural logarithm of sales (NBS) 
Lnπ The natural logarithm of pre-tax profits (NBS) 
DIFF_RATE The difference between the AETR in the host city and the corporate income 
tax rate in the foreign firm’s home country (NBS, Oriana, Oxford CBT 
corporate tax rate database) 
% Agriculture  the ratio of primary industry to GDP (city statistical yearbooks) 
% Manufacturing  the ratio of secondary industry to GDP (city statistical yearbooks) 
Population density Population per square kilometer (city statistical yearbooks) 
Population growth Yearly population growth rate (city statistical yearbooks) 
GDP per capita GDP per capita in real terms (unit: 10, 000 yuan, city statistical yearbooks) 
Ln(Wage) The natural logarithm of average wage (unit: yuan, city statistical 
yearbooks) 
Urbanization Urbanization index constructed from Koh et al. (2013) (city statistical 
yearbooks, own calculation) 
Road Growth growth rate of road transportation (unit: 10,000 ton, city statistical 
yearbooks) 
Ln(Hospital) The natural logarithm of the number of hospitals (city statistical yearbooks) 
% College student ratio of college students in total population (city statistical yearbooks) 
EXP/GDP the ratio of expenditures to GDP (city statistical yearbooks) 
Output growth growth rate of real GDP (city statistical yearbooks) 
Investment/GDP the ratio of investment to GDP (city statistical yearbooks) 









Table 2: Summary statistics 
 
A. City characteristics: 113 cities 2000-2013 
Variable No. of observations Mean Standard deviation 
AETR:00-13 1,469 0.121 0.052 
AETR:00-07 904 0.104 0.046 
AETR:07-13 565 0.147 0.051 
% Agriculture 1,469 13.737 8.506 
% Manufacturing 1,469 50.777 8.577 
Population density 1,469 0.581 0.437 
Population growth 1,469 0.008 0.013 
GDP per capita 1,469 2.529 3.034 
Ln(Wage) 1,469 9.871 0.586 
Urbanization 1,469 6.513 0.447 
Road Growth 1,469 0.168 1.309 
Ln(Hospital) 1,469 5.120 0.600 
% College student 1,465 0.013 0.018 
EXP/GDP 1,469 0.099 0.041 
Output growth 1,469 0.143 0.444 
Investment/GDP 1,469 0.450 0.202 
% loss-making firms 1,469 0.224 0.119 
 
B. Firm-level characteristics 
 
Variable No. of observations Mean Standard deviation 
A. Profit-shifting sample    
LnK 300,096 8.881 1.542 
Ln 𝜋 300,096 5.308 1.081 
LnL 300,096 7.316 1.822 
DIFF_RATE: 00-13 18,001 -0.146 0.144 
DIFF_RATE: 00-07 9,909 -0.176 0.140 
DIFF_RATE: 08-13 8,092 -0.108 0.140 
B. Investment sample    
LnK 443,917 8.885 1.553 










Table 3. Tax competition at the city level: Full sample 2000-2013 
Dependent variable: Using contiguity matrix 
Model 3 
Using the province matrix  
Model (3) 
AETR𝑖,𝑡 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 












Time lag   0.372*** 
(0.029) 
  0.342*** 
(0.029) 
Spatial-time lag   0.148*** 
(0.050) 
  0.124* 
(0.071) 








































































































































































Direct effect 1.0242 1.0138  1.0476 1.0295 direct 
Total effect 1.4205 1.2953  2.193 1.8622 total 
Indirect effect 0.3962 0.2815  1.1454 0.8327 indirect 
Spatial FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
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Log likelihood -3921.794 
 
-3885.749 -3492.851 -3863.747 -3848.193 -3465.755 
No. observations 1,469 1,469 1,356 1469 1469 1,356 
Notes: We use XX as the weight matrix in Columns 1-3, and YY as the weight matrix in Columns 4-6. 
Robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 4A. Tax competition at the city level: Subsample 2000-2007 
Dependent variable: Using contiguity matrix Using the province matrix  
AETR𝑖,𝑡 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 












Time lag   0.241*** 
(0.037) 
  0.249*** 
(0.037) 
Spatial-time lag   0.057 
(0.066) 
  -0.070 
(0.097) 










































































































































































Direct effect 1.0028 1.0016  1.0111 1.0081 direct 
Total effect 1.1173 1.0858  1.4663 1.387 total 
Indirect effect 0.1145 0.0842  0.4552 0.3789 indirect 
Spatial FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -2303.756 -2297.768 -1979.294 -2293.893 -2290.429 -1969.486 
No. observations 904 904 791 904 904 791 
Notes: We use XX as the weight matrix in Columns 1-3, and YY as the weight matrix in Columns 4-6. 
Robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 4B. Tax competition at the city level: Subsample 2008-2013 
Dependent variable: Using contiguity matrix Using the province matrix 
AETR𝑖,𝑡 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 












Time lag   0.329*** 
(0.053) 
  0.265*** 
(0.062) 
Spatial-time lag   0.232** 
(0.102) 
  0.396*** 
(0.141) 










































































































































































Direct effect 1.0237 1.0186  1.0388 1.0302  
Total effect 1.4144 1.335  2.0367 1.8762  
Indirect effect 0.3907 0.3364  0.9979 0.846  
Spatial FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -1382.987 -1377.007 -1086.542 -1370.717 -1366.907 -1078.304 
No. observations 565 565 452 565 565 452 
Notes: We use XX as the weight matrix in Columns 1-3, and YY as the weight matrix in Columns 4-6. 





Table 5: Reported profits and AETR  
   OLS  Within-groups 
Dep. Variable: lnπ (1)00-13 (2)00-07 (3)08-13 (4)00-13 (5)00-07 (6)08-13 
AETR -2.302*** -1.379*** -4.600*** -3.352*** -0.727*** -2.818*** 
 (0.149) (0.165) (0.259) (0.161) (0.198) (0.291) 
lnK 0.475*** 0.466*** 0.489*** 0.300*** 0.226*** 0.283*** 
 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) 
lnL 0.318*** 0.328*** 0.303*** 0.340*** 0.418*** 0.200*** 
 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.009) 
Province FE Yes Yes Yes 
   Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
   Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Number of groups 60,243 49,467 42,369 60,243 49,467 42,369 
Observations 300,096 185,456 114,640 300,096 185,456 114,640 
R-squared 0.353 0.344 0.329 0.101 0.078 0.065 







Table 6: Reported profits and differential tax rate between the host and parent 
countries  
 
  OLS Within-groups 
Dep. Variable: lnprofit (1)00-13 (2)00-07 (3)08-13 (4)00-13 (5)00-07 (6)08-13 
DIFF_RATE -0.623*** -0.692*** -0.524*** -1.173** -0.234 -2.452*** 
 (0.165) (0.204) (0.189) (0.496) (0.734) (0.782) 
lnK 0.448*** 0.430*** 0.466*** 0.341*** 0.263*** 0.307*** 
 
(0.016) (0.021) (0.019) (0.024) (0.037) (0.038) 
lnL 0.232*** 0.253*** 0.206*** 0.271*** 0.368*** 0.167*** 
 
(0.021) (0.028) (0.024) (0.025) (0.051) (0.030) 
Province FE Yes Yes Yes 
   Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Number of groups 3,137 2,471 2,847 3,137 2,471 2,847 
Observations 18,001 9,909 8,092 18,001 9,909 8,092 
R-squared 0.292 0.293 0.293 0.103 0.110 0.060 




Table 7: Responses of EBIT and pre-tax profits to tax incentives 
Shifting techniques Semi-elasticity of 
 
% of underlying 
techniques in total 
responses EBIT Pre-tax profits 
A. Excluding top 2.5% of EBIT/Pre-tax profits (Mean EBIT/Pre-tax profits=1.230) 
All  0.444 100% 
Non-financial 0.284 0.349 79% 
Financial  0.09 21% 
B. Excluding top 5% of EBIT/Pre-tax profits (Mean EBIT/Pre-tax profits=1.165) 
All  0.407 100% 
Non-financial 0.289 0.337 83% 
Financial  0.07 17% 
Notes: This table reports the estimated semi-elasticity of EBIT and pre-tax profits with 
respect to DIFF_RATE, based on the matched Oriana-NBS sample. The estimates are 
obtained from OLS regressions based on Equation 4. We control for industry, province, 





Table 8: Capital accumulation and local tax incentives, within-groups 
estimations 
 
Dep. Variable: lnK (1) 00-13 (2) 00-07 (3) 08-13 (4) 00-13 (5) 00-07 (6) 08-13 
              
AETR -0.472*** 0.100 -0.480*** 
   
 
(0.082) (0.090) (0.130) 
   ln (1 − AETR)−1 
   
-0.402*** 0.085 -0.426*** 
    
(0.070) (0.077) (0.110) 
lnQ 0.362*** 0.298*** 0.332*** 0.362*** 0.298*** 0.332*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of groups 72,578 60,573 50,628 72,578 60,573 50,628 
Observations 443,917 256,307 187,610 443,917 256,307 187,610 
Notes: Robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
